German defence minister 'annoyed' as debt brake threatens spending pledge +++ How do the Germans view NATO? +++ Leading NATO researcher sits down with Handelsblatt
Tuesday 9th July
Good morning. To mark the beginning of the NATO summit in DC, the German media are focusing on Germany’s security and defence policy, and the country’s relationship with the Alliance.
I first cover the SZ’s response to the ‘annoying’ underallocation of military spending in the newly-agreed Budget. Then I review Handelsblatt’s interview with Florence Gaub, Director of Research at the NATO academy in Rome. Finally, there’s some interesting polling the FAZ has commissioned on public perceptions of NATO and the ‘transatlantic’ relationship in Germany and the US.
SZ: Pistorius ‘annoyed’ by budget allocation; ‘Schuldenbremse’: Putin’s new favourite word
The Federal Budget for 2025 has been provisionally agreed by the governing ‘traffic light’ coalition of the SPD, Greens and FDP after weeks of tense negotiation (more on this tomorrow).
The coalition claim that spending on defence and security has been strengthened. As SZ’s ‘dossier’ Platz der Republik reports, however, comments contradicting this yesterday by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius have caught the attention of both domestic and international press.
"Yes, I received significantly less than I asked for. That's annoying for me because I can't initiate certain things at the speed that the Zeitenwende and the threat situation require."
In a comment piece for the main paper, Bundestag correspondent Nicholas Richter writes that the government’s insistence on tight fiscal rules, even on defence spending, is deeply damaging and dangerous to German national security and its standing with allies. He says that ‘Schuldenbremse’ will soon be Vladimir Putin’s favourite word, while Scholz and Pistorius will have a hard time explaining their inability to properly deliver on defence spending because of such a rule.
While Germany now finds itself in the most dangerous situation since the end of the Cold War, the ‘traffic light’ coalition is losing itself in concerns about public finances. This is primarily down to Finance Minister Christian Lindner, FDP, who has elevated the debt brake to the core of absolute truth. […] German military policy is the work of accountants rather than geostrategists.
This again reflects a change in thinking I have picked up on in a recent post on this topic. The more that ‘security’ is prioritised over ‘(fiscal) responsibility’ in the priorities of German public opinion, the more that the iron-clad orthodoxy by which German public spending has been governed for years seems out of step with the times.
Handelsblatt: interview with Florence Gaub, NATO Director of Research
Handelsblatt has been interviewing some interesting people recently (see yesterday’s post, which features another HB interview with one of Deutsche Bank’s CIOs on the French election). Today the business paper published a transcript of their sit-down with Florence Gaub, who they describe as NATO’s ‘top thinker’.
She is strikingly sanguine about a Trump presidency when it comes to NATO. She puts the Republican candidate’s recent comments about ‘letting Russia do whatever the hell they want’ to NATO members who ‘don’t pay’ for their defence as pure rhetoric, a ‘provocation’ designed to stimulate a response to a real problem: European underperformance in defence spending.
Trump has repeatedly threatened to leave Nato or to question the mutual assistance clause. Wasn't and isn't that blackmail?
“I don't see it as that dramatic. That's just Trump's negotiating strategy. He believes that the USA has been exploited for years because Europe has made itself comfortable while the USA has guaranteed its security. And he is right about that. The principle of NATO, joint defence, only works if everyone makes their contribution. An agreement was reached on two per cent of gross domestic product. And we have not achieved this in Germany for years.”
In other words, there really was something of a betrayal of the American people, as Trump says?
“Germany and other European states certainly didn't do what was agreed.”
Laub also says that NATO has now been ‘revitalised’ in recent years as a result of European re-engagement after being declared ‘braindead’ by Macron in 2019, and that this re-engagement will ultimately save the alliance.
“In Europe, people like to discuss things according to the motto: either you are European or transatlanticist. - And that is no longer possible. In future, you can only be a transatlanticist if you have a strong European defence, because the Americans are already, in strategic terms, in Asia. You can also see this in the fact that Trump says to the Europeans: Russia is ultimately your problem.”
Important to note that Laub does express concern about Trump’s stance on Ukraine. She suggests that after the US election there will be a ‘window for negotiation’, and that this may need to be seized if both sides seem willing to move from their ‘maximalist positions’.
On the issue of the ‘debt brake’ and the Zeitenwende, as discussed above, Laub seems to correspond to the trend towards a ‘security’ paradigm in fiscal thinking:
The Zeitenwende has become a catchphrase internationally. But it is not backed up by enough action. Well, the special fund (of €100bn) is there and the Minister of Defence is doing what he can. But in the end, he needs more money and, above all, the feeling that the Chancellery really wants the Zeitenwende. It is not enough to proclaim the Zeitenwende. In the end, it's not just about money, but about a whole new mindset when it comes to defence.
On the question of German ‘dependence’ on China representing the ‘same mistake’ as dependence on Russian energy supplies:
In the end, it is a weighty political and strategic decision that the Chancellery has to make. Of course, Germany is much more dependent on China than France, which is why this decision is much more difficult for us. And yet we have to recognise that: We are on a collision course with China. The country is organising disinformation campaigns in our markets and hacking European institutions. It is not simply a friendly trading partner. If economic networking continues in the same way as before, Berlin must realise that there will be a price to pay at some point.
Many companies think differently: they want to do business there as long as they can. Is that not legitimate?
In the end, foreign policy must decide which priorities take precedence - and be aware of the unintended consequences that can be provoked. There is a risk of achieving exactly what you want to avoid.
On Germany’s continual desire to play a ‘special role’ between East and West, and the threat that poses to the transatlantic partnership:
“I was in Washington a fortnight ago and was asked by an American from the security apparatus why Germany is acting in this way in its Russia and China policy. And I replied: Germany was afraid of a future without the protective hand of the USA and that Chancellor Scholz did not want to provoke anyone because of this. And then my interlocutor said: But doesn't he understand that it is precisely this behaviour that is causing the USA to withdraw? If Germany stays on this course, then we really do have a major problem. A united Europe and together with the USA - that is in our deepest interests. […] Of course, every Federal Chancellor is a little different. Some are more transatlantic, others are more European. But now, with Scholz, we have a chancellor who not only irritates some Republicans, but also doesn't really get on well with the French. But who will we still be friends with if things really go wrong?”
FAZ: What Germans and Americans think about NATO
The liberal-conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine has commissioned polling of German and American views towards NATO. The results show an overall positive view of the alliance, but with strong partisan divisions.
Voters for the mainstream parties in Germany (SPD, Green, FDP and CDU/CSU) each rate NATO as "very positive" or "somewhat positive" around ninety per cent of the time. It’s a different picture when it comes to AfD supportes: only 13 per cent of its supporters see the alliance as "very positive" and 38 per cent as "somewhat positive". There’s a noticeable split by party allegiance in the States, too.
On the threat posed by Russia, there’s a difference between mainstream and fringe party supporters in Germany, too. It’s interesting that 66% of BSW voters rated Russia as a ‘significant threat’ (große Bedrohung), more in line with mainstream voters, and significantly more than those who support Die Linke (42%), the party from which the BSW splintered .
71% of Democrats gave positive responses when asked about NATO, compared to only 54% of Republicans.
The survey also asked respondents questions about whether Germany and the US had a good partnership on different issues (‘maintaining security in Europe’; ‘dealings with Russia’; ‘dealings with China’). First graph shows the results from Germany, second the US. The only noticeable difference appears over China. While 58% of Americans still regard the two countries as partners in this respect, this figure slips below the 50% mark in Germany. 48% see the two countries as partners, 46% do not and 8% are undecided.
Surveying the results, FAZ’s political editor Olvier Kühn concludes quite prosaically:
75 years after its foundation, the opinion of NATO is favourable. Majorities in Germany and the United States view it favourably and as a guardian of peace. However, the clear partisan divide in the results also shows that problems could arise for the defence alliance and the transatlantic relationship if the Republicans in America and the AfD in Germany are given a significant say in shaping policy.